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Abstract: This paper aims at clarifying the relationship between individual bank and banking industry
behavior in credit expansion. We argue that the balance sheet structure of an individual bank is only
partially determined by its management decision about how aggressively to expand credit; it is also
determined by the balance sheet positions of other banks. This relationship is explicitly shown by a
disaggregation of the variable that enters into the simple money multiplier. The approach developed here
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1. Introduction
What determines the limits to the asset growth of an individual bank over the business cycle? Is there any
connection between an individual bank’s strategy and the behavior of the banking system as a whole –
and in particular, what are the macroeconomic effects of bank behavior? How does banking strategy
affect business-cycle outcomes?
In order to answer these questions, this paper aims at:
•  Clarifying and extending a remark by Keynes in his Treatise on Money, concerning the
relationship between individual-bank and banking industry behavior in credit expansion.
•  Focusing on banks’ strategic incentives in different credit-expansion environments to develop a
clearer understanding of how bank behavior affects business cycle dynamics.
•  Understanding better how micro and macro levels can be integrated into one model of bank
behavior, to see the mutual causality between banking strategy and business-cycle outcomes. The
key micro dimension introduced here is banks’ loan-making behavior.
This paper argues that the bank’s balance sheet is only partially determined by management decisions; as
stressed by Keynes (1960, published originally in 1930), it is also determined by the balance sheet
positions of other banks. This relationship can be explicitly shown by disaggregating the variables that
enter into the simple money multiplier. This opens the way to an integration of the micro and macro
levels in Keynesian banking-system analysis, and sheds light on the impact of banking strategy on
business cycle dynamics.
2. Keynesian and Post Keynesian ideas about banking: what remains undone?
One of the most fertile fields of analysis opened by Keynes and the Post Keynesian economists is the
study of the relations between banks and economic activity. From the Treatise on Money, to the General
Theory, to the controversy with Robertson and Ohlin after the publication of the General Theory, Keynes
pointed out the key importance of the bank system in supporting investment. Following Keynes, Minsky
(1982, 1986) developed his financial fragility hypothesis (FFH). Minsky’s writings highlight the relation
between the banking system and the trend to financial fragility during the upturn of the business cycle,
illustrating how crisis can occur as an endogenous result of these units’ own economic dynamics. Indeed,
the term financial fragility is now used freely within the economics literature.
Minsky’s framework, and many other works on banking, asserts that banks are special, in that they
perform activities that are non-substitutable with other economic units, and thus are especially important
in macroeconomic outcomes. The challenge is then posed: appropriating banks’ special role introduces
the need to connect micro and macroeconomic analysis. In virtually all studies, this connection between
micro and macro analysis is handled by investigating the actions of a representative bank.
Studies on financial fragility are an exception. Virtually all of these studies analyze the impact of the
bankruptcy or credit problems of some highly exposed banks on the fragility of banking system as a
whole, and consequently, on systemic risk. Contagion effects are the primary . A vast literature is
concerned with this subject and most part of it is concentrated into the negative externality that a
bankruptcy causes to the bank system as a whole into an asymmetric informational environment.3
2.1. Keynes’ ideas about banking
Keynes never wrote an extended tract on banking. Nonetheless, his works over the years are littered with
occasional comments and analyses of banks’ behavior. One of his later papers contains the comment that
banks hold the key position in the shift of the economic system from a lower to a higher level of
economic activity (Keynes, 1973). This point had not been developed much in the General Theory (GT).
The GT presented a schema for understanding the extent of economic activity at any point in time, using
a comparative static approach. The GT appreciated the impact of real time and uncertainty on decision-
making, but paid little attention to the dynamics of movement through time. Discussions of financial
issues in the GT thus focus on the links between the liquidity role of money, investment decisions, and
uncertainty.
What Keynes meant by his relatively cryptic post-GT comment is perhaps revealed in a passage in the
Treatise on Money which concerns banks’ financing of investment activity. There, Keynes wrote that
banks’ volume of reserves depends to a large extent on other banks’ finance policies – that is, on the
growth rate of other banks’ loans. Consequently, an individual bank can grow much faster than other
banks only if it increases its market share of total banking-sector deposits. But this bank’s rapid-growth
strategy will, at the same time, reduce its reserves and strengthen other banks’ lending capacity by
providing them with more available funds (free reserves). As Keynes (1960, p. 26-7) stated:
There can be no doubt that, in the most convenient use of language, all deposits are ‘created’ by
the bank holding them. It is certainly not the case that the banks are limited to that depositors
should come on their own initiative bringing cash or checks. But it is equally clear that the rate at
which an individual bank creates deposits on its own initiative is subject to certain rules and
limitations;- it must keep step with the other banks and cannot raise its own deposits relatively to
the total deposits out of proportion to its quota of the banking business of the country. Finally, the
‘pace’ common to all the member banks is governed by the aggregate of their reserve resources.
This analytical point finds an echo in Keynes’ famous comment that ‘bankers would rather hang together
than hang separately.’ These interrelated points were registered well before the GT was written; and in
any case, Keynes’ post-GT comment about the role of banks in determining the level of economic activity
does not refer back to them explicitly.
2.2. Post Keynesian ideas about banking
The problem of banking behavior and its impact on economic outcomes has received substantial attention
among Post Keynesian economists. Two lines of thought have predominated: one concerns banks’ role in
business cycles, the other banks’ role in money endogeneity.
1
The Post Keynesian approach to banking and financial intermediation in business-cycle fluctuations
views the banking system as a channel through which agents’ perceptions of risks, and hence business-
cycle fluctuations, both influence and are strongly influenced by non-probabilistic uncertainty. Current
data influence the forecasts and confidence of bank and non-bank firms concerning returns from
investment. In a monetary economy, even the best forecasts of the future provide agents with no degree of
certainty about what decisions (made in advance of outcomes) will best reflect their preferences.
Incorporating more data will improve forecast algorithms but not make them less certain; the data needed
to make agents forecasts more certain in an absolute sense simply do not exist.
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Different perspectives over banks’ role in an economy operating under uncertainty have emerged. In the
theory of money endogeneity as developed by Moore (1988) and Lavoie (1992), banks accommodate the
demand for credit by the non-financial corporate and household sectors. As long as central bank policy is
expansionary, banks’ key role is to serve as a reliable transmission mechanism for other sectors’ pursuit
of consumption and investment spending.
An approach developed by Dymski (1988), Wray (1990), and Kregel (1997), based more explicitly on
Minsky (1982), banks in uncertain environments seek to base their behavior on conventions rooted in
their histories with their customers and also on the average behavior of other banks. So if the banking
system as a whole is expanding credit, most individual banks will follow this course of action. Under
uncertainty, this is the safe way to compete with other banks, since it guarantees both market-share and
institutional reputation. Because of this “hang together” mentality, banks’ behavior tends to amplify the
scale of economic upswings and downturns. When banks instead face liquidity shocks and adverse
conditions in their borrowing markets, banks face and react to the same liquidity pressures as do other
economic units. In this perspective, the state of the interbank and borrowed-funds markets is crucial in
determining banks’ role in expanding or contracting credit (and hence in determining the amplitude of
cyclical fluctuations).
This debate on the proper characterization of banks – as either reliable transmission mechanisms or as
units sometimes constrained by liquidity risk – is unresolved. Under either interpretation, bank behavior
has the effect of widening cyclical swings. In the upturn, banks’ accommodative behavior – their
willingness to make loans that increase other units’ leverage, combined with their relative unconcern
about liquidity risk – is a factor that increases cyclical volatility. Bankers’ optimistic views about the
viability of firms’ debt structures, typical of a period of euphoria, leads them to increase their loans in
response to firms’ rising credit demand. In the downturn, quite the opposite sequence unfolds.
This literature has paid little attention to how banks’ strategies and banking-system dynamics can work to
amplify business cycle dynamics. Minsky’s model and the work of Moore and others focus on
representative banks. The notion of diverse behaviors among banks have not been introduced, nor have
the implications of strategic diversity for the link between micro and macro processes. We return to the
question of banks’ cyclical role in section 4 after exploring these topics in section 3.
3. Are bank balance sheets exclusively the result of their own strategic decisions?
In this section we argue that the balance sheet structure of an individual bank is only partially determined
by its management decision, because it is also determined by the balance sheets positions of other banks,
as first stressed by Keynes (1960). This relationship can be explicitly shown by a disaggregation of the
variables that enter into the simple money multiplier, thus opening a way to integrating the micro and
macro levels that comprise Post Keynesian banking system analysis. This relation is suggested by what
we will call the ‘Money Multiplier Approach.’
3.1. The Money Multiplier Approach (MMA)
The MMA shows how an initial increase in the monetary base can generate a bigger increase in the
amount of means of payment narrowly defined (that is, M1 = cash + demand deposits). The variables in
the money multiplier express the idea that the volume of money depends on the fraction of deposits to M1
that the public wishes to hold, and also on the loan/reserve ratio that banks desire. Following the
conventional approach in this literature, this money multiplier is defined as ζ,  where ζ = 1/(1-D(1-R)) –5
and where consequently, ∆M1 = ζ∆B – given that B = monetary base (cash + reserves); D = demand
deposits/M1; and R = reserves/demand deposits.
For a representative bank that holds only cash and loans as assets, and maintains only deposits as
liabilities, the impact of the money multiplier is readily summarized in Table 1:
Table 1.  Representative bank balance sheet
∆ Assets ∆ Liabilities
Cash:  R D ζ ∆B Deposits:  D ζ ∆B
Loans:  (1 – R) D ζ ∆B Net Worth:  ∆ NW = 0
For our purpose, the key point here is another process, which occurs together with the money expansion
and involves the operation of the banking system. The money multiplier’s behavioral coefficients – that
is, D and R – not only determine the amount of the increase in M1 from an initial increase in monetary
base (B): they also settle the dimensions of each item of the balance sheet of the representative bank. For
example, the amount of cash that a representative bank or the bank system holds is a function of D and R.
Note that the conventional view of the money multiplier, which suggests some automatism in the way
that money is created, implicitly admits that the structure of the bank system’s balance sheet changes
during the growth process of M1. This can happen due to an increase in the monetary base or due to a
change in the behavioral coefficient. This sort of balance-sheet change is triggered in particular when the
rate of growth of money exceeds that of the bank’s net worth. As the banking system begins to make
loans, banks’ overall assets begin to grow. Given that net worth is stable in the short run, bank leverage
grows as a result of the money multiplier process. Indeed, it is reasonable to expect that net worth will
remain stable in the short run, since the financial results of credit operations – such as net interest
revenues – will only have an impact on bank profits (and hence net worth) sometime later.
3.2. The disaggregated bank multiplier: the case of different bank strategies
The former section showed how an increase in the monetary base or a change in behavioral coefficients
can change the characteristics of banks’ balance sheets. This section points out another factor that can
alter banks’ balance sheets: banks’ adoption of different strategies.
2 Here we suppose that each bank,
seeking to enhance its prospects for profitability given its own pools of savers and prospective borrowers,
sets its own reserve/deposit ratio. Strategic choice here then measures how aggressively each bank is in
loan-making, given its deposit base. The more aggressively loans are made, the more risks the bank takes
on.
To embody this approach, we allow for the possibility that each bank has a different capacity to obtain
deposits. That is, each bank has a deposit base, which is distinct from its total deposits. Total deposits
include deposits created in the process of loan creation as well as deposits received when the bank accepts
                                                          
2 We introduce only the simplest notion of bank strategy here, as this is sufficient for our analytical purposes. In the real world,
bank strategic choices extend well beyond the pace of loan growth, and encompass choices regarding branch networks,
whether to offer new kinds of financial services, whether to segment loan markets, whether to merge with other banks or non-
bank firms, which deposit customers to target, whether to reduce credit risk through securitization, and so on. See Dymski
(1999).6
reserves from its liability-holders. The bank’s deposit base equals deposits of the latter type – that is,
deposits received on the basis of ongoing savings and transaction customer relationships. The bank’s
deposit base is linked to its market power: its size depends on the bank’s branch network, its marketing
policy, its policies regarding interest rates on loans and deposits, and so on. In this conception, then, the
variables that express the strategies of each individual bank are:
Ri – reserve policy of bank “i”
Γi - deposit attraction of bank “i” (fraction of total deposits D).
Note that Σ Γi = 1, derived from the fact that each bank will absorb Γi of total deposits. Each Γi is
considered a constant.
Here, then, each bank initially establishes its desired reserve/deposit ratio based on how aggressive its
strategy is.
3 Supposing net worth is constant, as this ratio falls for any specific bank, that bank increases
its leverage and also takes on higher liquidity risk. Note that loan-making involves a reduction of reserves
(R) and hence higher leverage and liquidity risk.
As individual banks make loans and reduce their reserves, the multiplier process begins to run,
amplifying total deposits. These increases in demand deposits increase both total liabilities and total
assets. The multiplier process also facilitates more loan growth, since loan volume is given at any point in
time by (1 – R) D ζ ∆B and since both ζ and (1 – R) are growing. For the individual bank involved in this
process, its capacity to absorb any adverse shocks falls as this process proceeds and, at the same time, its
exposure to liquidity risk rises.
The multiplier (ζ) does not change with the introduction of the individual-bank variables. Suppose, for
example, there is an exogenous increase in the monetary base, ∆B. Each bank will then receive an initial
increment in deposits of Γi D ∆B. Total deposits in the first round of the multiplier will then be D ∆B ΣΓi
(or D ∆B, as Σ Γi = 1). The next step will include new loans (1 – Ri) Γi D ∆B for each bank; total loans
for all banks will be D ∆B Σ(1 – Ri Γi). So, new deposits, Γi D
2∆B Σ(1 – Ri), will be credited to bank i in
the next round, and so on.
Taking the entire multiplier process into account, the money multiplier is Μ = 1/[1- D((Σ (1-Ri))Γi), a
disaggregated version of the conventional aggregate multiplier, ζ = 1/[1- D (1-R))].
 4 The disaggregated
multiplier M highlights the fact that the general reserve fraction is an average of the reserve fraction
established by each bank firm, taking into account the relative marginal ability of each bank to attract
deposits, Γi.
                                                          
3 We are considering as bank reserves not only primary reserves (cash) but also secondary reserves, that is, other liquid assets
that can be converted rapidly into cash without significant losses. See for a more precise definition of liquidity, Davidson
(1992).
4 The formula for Μ results from the summation (1 + D (1 – Σ Ri Γi) + D
2 (1 – Σ Ri Γi)
2 + ... + D
n (1 – Σ Ri Γi)
n); that is, 1/ (1 -
D (1 – Σ Ri Γi)).7
Table 2. Balance sheet of bank “i” at the end of the multiplier process
Assets Liabilities
Cas h: Ri Γi D ∆B ΣD
z (1 - (Σ Ri Γi))
z, or Ri Γi D ∆B
Μ
Deposits: Γi  D ∆B ΣD
z (1 - (Σ Ri Γi))
z , or
  Γi  D ∆
B Μ
Loans: (1 – Ri) Γi  D ∆B ΣD
z (1 - (Σ Ri Γi))
z, or (1 –
Ri) Γi D ∆B Μ
Net Worth: ∆ NWi
This disaggregated approach to the money multiplier shows clearly that the balance sheet of each bank is
affected by the strategies adopted by the other ones -- the point stressed by Keynes (1930). Table 2 shows
the balance sheet of bank i at the end of the multiplier process. The balance sheet of bank “i” will be a
function of the public preference’s for deposits (D), of  the ability of bank “i” to attract deposits (Γi), and
of other banks’ reserve/deposit ratios.
3.3 A simulation of a change in bank behavior
It is common in Post Keynesian studies of bank behavior to conceptualize banks that change their
portfolios in search of perceived profit opportunities. This approach views banks as active firms, which
manage their liabilities – they lend before receiving deposits when they decide to accommodate the
demand for credit.
5 Banks in this position plan to obtain reserves through borrowing, if needed, to meet
their financial commitments.
6  So at least during some time periods, banks manage imbalances between
reserves and deposits. What are the limits for this kind of action?
To illustrate the consequences of liability-managing behavior, we suppose that a bank “k” increase its
loans in an amount E. We also suppose that other banks do not change their Ri. So, part of the loans will
be deposited in each bank, in an amount D Γi Μ E. At the end of the multiplier process, the bank k will
have a balance sheet as described in Table 3:
Table 3. Bank “k” balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Cash: Rk D Γk Μ (E) – (E -  Γk Μ(E)) Deposits: D Γk Μ (E)
Loans: (1 – Rk) D Γk Μ (E) + E NWk
In making its loan, bank k loses reserves (E -  Γk Μ(E)) to other banks.  For the banking system as a
whole, this loan-making expands the monetary base at the expense of bank k’s reserves. From this point,
bank k’s reserves begin to grow in proportion to the increase of money that it initiated. At the end of the
                                                          
5 For example, Minsky (1994, p. 156) states: “In contrast to the orthodox quantity theory of money, the financial instability
hypothesis takes banking seriously as a profit-seeking activity. Banks seek profits by financing activity; like all entrepreneurs
in a capitalist economy, bankers are aware that innovation assures profits. Thus using the term generically for all
intermediaries in finance (whether they be brokers or dealers), bankers are merchants of debt who strive to innovate in the
assets they acquire and the liabilities they market”.
6 The level of reserves needed depends on the prevailing institutional and regulatory environment. See, in this connection,
Keynes (1930) and Goodhart (1979).8
process, the reserve variation will be (Rk D Γk - 1) E. Since 0 <  Ri < 1, 0 < D < 1 e 0 < Γk < 1, the
changes in reserves will be negative, but not as great in magnitude as -1. Consequently, if bank k expands
its loans while other banks do not, it will lose reserves to the remaining ones, though less than the total
amount it first lent.
Conversely, the other banks gain the reserves that bank k loses. Suppose that the remaining banks do not
change their Ri’s and that the Γi’s are constant; in this case, other banks’ financial structures still change
due to the growth in their leverage. As Table 4 shows, bank “i” loans will raise by the effect of the
increase in bank k loans (E). And, since by assumption NWi does not change, both leverage of loans and
leverage of assets will grow.
Table 4. Bank “i” balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Cash: Ri D Γi Μ (∆B + E) Deposits: D Γi Μ (∆B + E) + Di
Loans: (1 – Ri) D Γi Μ (∆B + E) NWi
3.4. Financial fragility and the interaction between banks’ balance sheets
As Minsky (1982) pointed out, financial fragility can be understood as a measure of the resistance of the
bank system to shocks. Balance sheet indicators of bank susceptibility to  specific shocks have two
distinct dimensions: (i) how much a bank can lose in the event of a shock; (ii) how losses originating
from shocks will be absorbed. In this connection, two indicators connected to this paper’s themes are
suggested. The first is an index of liquidity, defined as the ratio of reserves plus securities to deposits. The
second is an index of solvency, that is, bank leverage.
The liquidity index shows how much money a bank has to cover withdrawals from the public or from
other banks during check clearing. The formula used here is:
V1  = (reserves + securities)/deposits
This leverage formula indirectly shows how losses could be covered by bank net worth. When a bank’s
leverage ratio is high, given the value of Ri, its likelihood of problems with bad loans is higher, for any
given proportion of bad loans to total loans.
V2 = loans / net worth
We introduce now the accounts in absolute value terms in the bank balance sheet, foregoing the approach
emphasizing variations in each account, have been shown to this point. In this representation, the bank
balance sheet has the following structure:9
Table 5. Representative bank balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Cash (C) Deposits (D)
Securities (T) Interbank and borrowed funds (AFL)
Loans (E) Net worth (NW)
In Table 6, the two indexes (V1  and V2) are shown for two stylized banks, i and k, with different
expansion strategies. This depiction is sufficient to capture the effects of strategic variability in the
banking system as a whole. Table 6 shows the results of a comparative statics exercise. The balance-sheet
situation of the banks is shown at three points in time: (1) before the initial expansion of monetary base;
(2) after the expansion of monetary base; and (3) after bank k  autonomously increase its loans in an
amount E.









[Ri D Γi Μ ∆B + (Ci
+ Ti)]/(Di + D Γi Μ
∆B)
[Rk D Γk Μ ∆B +
(Ck + Tk)]/[Dk+ D 
Γk Μ ∆B]
[Ri D Γi Μ(∆B + E) +
Ci+ Ti]/ [Di + D Γi Μ
(∆B + E) ]
[Rk D Γk Μ (∆B + E) - E
+ Ck + Tk]/ [Di +  D Γk Μ
( ∆B + E ) ]
V2 Ei/NWk Ek/NWk
[(1 – Ri) D Γi Μ∆B
+ Ei]/ NWk
[(1 – Rk) D Γk Μ
∆B + Ek] / NWk
[(1 – Ri) D Γi Μ (∆B +
E) + Ei] / NWi
[(1 – Ri) D Γk Μ ( ∆B +
E ) +E  + E k] / NWk
The first moment, the starting point of the exercise, shows the autonomous behavioral strategy adopted by
each bank. The V1 and V2 of banks i and k are not shown as explicit functions of another banks’
influence, since they consider the effects of neither monetary-base expansion nor changes in bank
strategies.
The second moment shows exactly how the expansion of monetary base modifies the liquidity index and
leverage for both banks. Loans are expanded on the basis of each bank’s R and Γ; it is assumed here that
securities (T) and net worth (NW) do not change. Changes in V1 depend on the magnitude T as part of
total liquid assets (C + T). Concerning V2, as assets grow, the risk of insolvency increases, as the index of
leverage shows.
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The third moment evaluates the impact of a one-time increase in loans E by bank k. This action by bank k
increases its exposure more than that of bank i. Bank k ends up with lower V1 and higher V2 than the rest
of the banking system, represented here by bank i. In other words, both the liquidity and solvency risk of
bank k increases. Also note that while bank i remains more conservative than bank k, the impact of bank
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k’s aggressive loan-making is to make it too more leveraged than before, despite its passive strategy of
credit expansion.
One can conclude from this analysis that:
(1) The banking system balance sheet is affected by the multiplier expansion of money, since its net worth
does not change in the same way as does the monetary base. So, the conventional multiplier supposes,
implicitly, that banks become more fragile (and accept this change in their status) during the monetary
expansion as the risks of liquidity and insolvency increase.
(2) The balance sheet of the individual bank and the risks that each bank faces depend partially from
other banks’ portfolio decisions. This result does not depend on the effects of bank refinancing of
outstanding defaults (that is on the ratio of bad loans to total loans), but from banks’ own process of
money creation.
(3) If banks have different rhythms of loan expansion, then ceteris paribus, the more aggressive bank will
lose reserves to other banks, and at the same time it will take on higher liquidity and insolvency risks.
In other words, more aggressive banks will be more financially fragile than other banks, a factor that
might impose a limit on its loan growth strategy.
3.5 A numerical simulation of a change in the credit strategy of bank “k”
The approach developed in the former section can be exemplified with a simulation. Let us consider a
bank system with only two groups of banks, denominated as bank i and bank k. As Table 7 denotes, both
banks initially have the same figures in their balance sheets.
 8
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Reserves 333.33 Demand Deposits 666.7
   Cash 200.00
   Securities 133.33
Loans 333.33 Net Worth 100.0
Fixed Assets 100.00
Total Assets 766.67 Total Liabilities 766.67
Macroeconomic parameters
reserve-to-deposit
ratio 0.5 cash/M1 0.2
deposit absorption
of each bank 0.5 Monetary Base 1000
DD/M1 0.8
Bank "k" and "i"'s  financial policy
Table 7. Bank "k" and bank "i"'s balance sheet11
The simulation assumes that the deposit absorption of the two groups of banks are autonomously
determined and equal to 0.5. It means that each bank has an equal share of any new deposit created or
destroyed in the banking system.
The financial policies of the two groups of banks are summarized by their reserve (that is, reserve-to-
deposit) ratios. These ratios are equal to 0.5 at the starting point of the simulation. The reserve ratio is the
sum of required reserve ratio (0.3 of demand deposits), in cash, with voluntary ratio (0.2 of demand
deposits), held as securities. It is assumed that since a bank has more reserves than are required, some
reserves will be used to purchase securities. In the case that a bank has fewer reserves than required it will
sell securities.
By exploring the interactions among loans, leverage, assets and reserves, the simulation shows how the
two groups of banks and the whole bank system will behave if bank k changes its financial policy -- that
is, its reserve-to-deposit ratio -- while bank i maintain the same reserve ratio (0.5). The basic idea is that
bank k changes its reserve ratio according to its credit policy. As bank k seeks to increase its loans, it
reduces its reserves. Furthermore, the simulation assumes the following systemic parameters concerning
the preferences of the public: cash/M1= 0.2 and DD/M1 = 0.8.
Figure 1 shows what happen to banks loans as bank k shifts its reserve ratio. If the reserve ratio increases
(as it does along the horizontal dimension of Figure 1), the loans of the two groups of banks grow due to
the increase in the money multiplier. However, loans of bank k will grow faster than loans of bank i,
increasing bank k’s loan-market share. Conversely, if bank k reduces the reserve ratio, the loans of both
banks decreases, with bank k loans diminishing more than those of bank i.
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This first result illustrates that even if the financial policy of bank i does not change, its loans will grow.
Of course, there are other possibilities not explored in this simulation. For example, if bank i maintained a
constant volume of loans, the reserve ratio of bank i would increase; its assets would grow as the bank
increased the volume of securities in its portfolio.12
Figure 2 shows that banks’ exposure to credit risk will vary with their loan volume. As bank k increases
its reserve-to-deposit ratio, the loan-related leverage of both banks grows – though bank k’s leverage
increases more than bank i’s. Conversely, if bank k’s reserve ratio falls, both banks’ leverage will
decrease, but that of bank k will decrease more. In other words, although both banks increase their
insolvency risk (V2) when bank k decreases its reserve ratio, insolvency risk is bigger for bank k than for
bank i.
Figure 2. Leverage of loans (loans/net worth) for different reserve-to-
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Figure 3 shows that shifts in bank k’s reserve ratio lead to changes in total banking-sector assets. As bank
k’s reserve ratio decreases, the assets of both banks increases in the same rhythm, due to increasing loan
volume. This result follows because, by assumption, both banks have the same rate of deposit absorption;
if deposit absorption rates differed, so would banks’ asset growth rates. This simulation also shows that
the banking sector’s total  assets change with a change in any bank’s finance policy. Even banks that
maintain a fixed reserve ratio (bank “i,” here) experience an increase in assets. This result conforms with
the simple multiplier model.
Of course, bank i is not compelled to expand or reduce its loans as an automatic response to expansions or
reductions in bank k’s loan volume. Suppose instead that bank i maintains a constant loan volume. In this
event, when bank k increases its loan volume, bank i will increase its reserve-to-deposit ratio, weakening
the monetary multiplier effect. But at the same time, bank i will experience an increase in its assets (just
equal the growth in its reserve volume) due to bank k’s loan-volume expansion.
The increase (or reduction) in bank k’s reserve ratio causes a transfer of reserves between banks. If bank
k’s reserve ratio diminishes because it is increasing loan volume, these reserves are released to the public
and to banks (here, bank i) that have not changed their reserve ratios. This situation pushes bank k to
borrow money in the market for reserves, in the interbank market, and from the central bank. In this case,
bank k will have to sell securities (and/or issue new securities) obtain needed new reserves.13
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reserves-to-deposits ratio of bank k Source: Annex 114
So, bank k’s reducing its reserve ratio increases the banking system’s exposure to liquidity risk (by
generating more demand deposits with total reserves constant); and the liquidity risk of the aggressive
bank k increases pari passu as it increases its loans and loses reserves (Figure 4). Conversely, when bank
k’s reserve ratio increases, reserves elsewhere in the banking system (as well as those held by the public)
are absorbed by bank k; so this bank’s exposure to liquidity risk diminishes.
The previous paragraph has an important consequence regarding the determination of banking- system
liquidity risk. The monetary multiplier suggests that expanding the average reserve ratio diminishes M1.
So, if the public’s preference for cash/M1 is constant, the public demand for cash also declines. The
reserves of the banking system as a whole increase as well. This guarantees a natural defense against bank
runs. Alternatively, the reduction of the reserve ratio increases M1. So, if the cash/M1 is maintained
constant, the public demand for cash increases (Figure 5). As a result, banking system – as a whole - will
be more exposed to liquidity risk, ceteris paribus.
In sum, this simulation highlights the fact that individual banks’ balance sheets are hardly the result of
these banks’ choices. The behavior of the set of all banks – of aggregate bank behavior -- is an essential
element in determining the size and composition of bank balance sheets.












4. Banking strategy and the business cycle: insights from the simulation model
In this section, we discuss the impact of bank behavior on business cycle dynamics by focusing on the
relationship between banking-system and individual banks’ behavior in different credit-expansion15
environments. For this purpose we explore the analytical structure developed in the former section during
four phases of the business cycle: stagnation, upturn, downturn and crisis.
According to the financial fragility hypothesis (Minsky, 1982, 1986), the dynamic of the economic
growth induces firms to become increasingly indebted to expand their investment. In this connection,
cyclical fluctuations result from the way that firms finance their asset positions: increasing
macroeconomic financial fragility in the upturn, for example, is associated with an increase in the number
of speculative units. The decision to invest (alternatively, to take an asset position) runs hand-in-hand
with the choice of the means of financing. Both decisions, taken together, define the extent of the
economy’s vulnerability to adverse changes in the economic situation. An economy will be more or less
fragile in the aggregate according to the preponderance of hedge or speculative units. As Dymski and
Pollin (1992, p.40) state: “Minsky argues that there is an inherent tendency for capitalist financial
structures to move from states of robustness to fragility over time. This is due to the shift in expectations
that occurs over the course of a business cycle, and the way this shift is transmitted through the financial
system.”
Cyclical fluctuations are then affected and even triggered by the influence of current data on bank and
non-bank firms’ states of expectations and confidence regarding future returns from investment projects.
As we have already stressed, banks have an important and contradictory role in the business cycle: their
accommodative behavior amplifies economic growth during the cyclical upturn; and it also amplifies the
downturn, due to banks’ increasing liquidity preference as their expectations about the future, and their
borrowers’ expectations, become pessimistic.
9
4.1. Stagnation
At the trough of the business cycle, when the state of confidence is especially infected with uncertainty
about the future, current information is dominated by the bankruptcies of indebted firms, while banks
(like their borrowers) must contend with delays in contractual payments. Realized profits and profit
expectations are still low. Indebtedness is viewed as extremely risky because economic agents still
perceive a high degree of uncertainty. Since agents’ expectations have deteriorated, given their low state
of confidence in the future, the aggregate demand for credit is low. Healthy firms tend to adopt a hedge
posture: that is, safety margins between profits and financial commitments are sufficient to ensure that, in
all future periods, profits will exceed interest expense and amortization payments (here, expected gross
revenue affords some margin over debt payment commitments).
10
Under these conditions, what would happen if the growth rate of loans of an individual bank were to
increase faster than the average growth rate of other banks? In this phase of the business cycle, the
individual bank (bank k, per section 3) that increases its loans faster than others (bank i), without a
respective change in its market share of deposits (measured by Γi ) would loose reserves. As a result,, the
risk of liquidity (V1) of the individual bank would increase. On the other hand, as bank leverage increases
due to the expansion of bank k’s loans, its insolvency risk (V2) tends to increase as well. In this case, it
would not be possible to maintain an aggressive finance policy for a longer term, since the demand for
                                                          
9 The liquidity preference approach explains banks’ balance-sheet strategies as due more fundamentally to perceptions of risks
and profit opportunities than to choices over individual liabilities: “For a given state of expectations, bank’s liquidity
preference will determine the desired profile of the assets they purchase and their prices, that is, the rate of returns each type of
asset must offer to compensate for their degree of iliquidity”. (Carvalho, 1999, p. 132)
10 For a hedge unit the margin of safety is positive for any probable increase in the rate of interest once it is completely hedged
in relation to its cash flow from future commitments.16
credit is low. Therefore, the bank could find borrowers that would accept its credit offer only for a very
short period, despite reducing its interest rate on loans and the spread on their credit operations.
Furthermore, credit risk would tend to grow rapidly as a consequence of the bank’s aggressive finance
policy: this firm would not be able to generate enough profits to meet its financial commitments, due to
the stagnant state of the economy. Under these conditions, convention instructs banks to be cautions, that
is, to adopt a more conservative strategy; as a result, they tilt their asset portfolio toward short term and/or
more liquid assets. High liquidity preference prevails in banking strategy.
4.2. Upturn
The beginning of the boom depends crucially on the sharing of improved expectations regarding the
economy’s future prospects by non-bank and bank agents. As agents’ state of confidence improves,
overall perceptions of risks decline. More profits and growing utilization of production capacity stimulate
new investments. As a result, the demand for credit tends to increase. Firms tend to adopt a speculative
posture -- that is, they maintain smaller margins of safety than hedge units, reckoning that financial costs
will not increase so much as to make their plans unworkable. In this situation, the expected gross capital
income obtained in initial periods is generally insufficient to fully amortize the debt that is initially taken
on; but the expectation is that subsequent years will see a revenue surplus sufficient to offset this initial
deficit.
In the case of banks, improving expectations lead to shifts in liquidity preference, from a more to a less
conservative and defensive posture; consequently, banks adopt a more accommodative posture in
supplying credit. Bankers react to non-bank firms’ own optimistic views regarding the viability of these
firms’ debt structures, increasing loans in order to respond to these firms’ heightened credit demand.  The
banks’ search for more profits in the upturn can induce them to adopt a more speculative posture: a bank
may not only seek the larger monetary returns associated with riskier assets, but also increase their loan
leverage and offer their customers special guarantees.
In this context, what happens to the balance sheet of an individual bank that increases the growth rate of
its loans faster than the average loan growth rate? As section 3 has shown, the level of reserves at this
bank (k) declines and its liquidity risk increases. Bank k can sustain an aggressive finance policy only at
the risk of increasing raise its liquidity risk (V1) and insolvency risk (V2), that is, heightening its own
financial fragility. Further, as section 3 has illustrated, the rest of the banking sector (bank i) too becomes
more fragile (though less than bank k’s increased fragility): its leverage increases as its balance sheet
growth rate is quickened due to its being pulled along by bank k’s faster pace of credit expansion. This
simulation model illustrates very starkly the interaction between individual banks’ strategic choices and
the underlying conventional behavior of the banking system: individual banks with especially aggressive
growth strategies can influence the average growth rate of the entire banking sector; and  individual
banks don’t have their own distinct strategies, but which follow the average loan growth rate of the
banking sector as a whole, are pulled along when the sectoral growth rate changes.
So if the banking system as a whole is expanding credit, we should expect that any individual bank will
expand in the same direction – unless it makes a strategic choice to be contrarian. Under uncertainty,
gearing a bank’s expansion strategy to the trend in the banking sector is safer, since this guarantee both
the bank’s market share and its institutional reputation. This analytical situation illustrates precisely the
material basis of Keynes’ famous comment that “bankers would rather hang together than hang
separately.”17
4.3. Downturn
The collapse of asset values that occurs during the downturn, because of the position-making problems of
units engaged in speculative and Ponzi finance, leads to a collapse of investment. Such a collapse will
lead to a shortfall in the profit flows generated by capital assets, which in turn makes the fulfillment of
business financial commitments more difficult, if not impossible. Many reliable payers become bad
borrowers: falling profits force some hedge and speculative units become Ponzi units, as the cash flows
needed to validate even initially hedge-financing arrangements may not be forthcoming.
11 Non-bank
firms’ declining profits and increasing financial commitments reduce their safety margins. Banks
consequently reevaluate borrowers’ risks upward, and incorporate these expectations into loan risk
premia, leading to higher loan rates. These higher rates increase firms’ borrowing costs just when
refinancing is most needed. The banking system as a whole refuses to roll over firm debts whenever
possible: credit rationing tightens and bad loans grow rapidly in volume.
So the shocks that trigger cyclical downturns lead banks to revise their expectations just as their state of
confidence is shaken. Financial institutions’ liquidity preference increases, and leads them to make fewer
loans and seek out less profitable but more liquid assets. The search for more liquidity leads banks to
reduce the average term on their assets, to maintain more surplus reserves, and to purchase assets with
high liquidity, such as government securities.
Our simulation experiment suggests that ceteris paribus, the overall decrease in loan volume results in
deposit losses for all banks. This moderates the rising liquidity risk of the banking sector (which involves
both higher open-market borrowing costs and the threat of a run on deposits). Bank k, which has a more
stable asset target than banks as a whole (bank i), and which is slower to change, will take on a
disproportionate share of bad loans and of the adjustment problems associated with the downturn. It will
face problems related to heightened liquidity risk (V1), to declining reserves, and to credit risk problems
because of a rising volume of bad loans. Again, the strategic commitment of bank k to a stable asset
target pulls other banks into taking on more bad loans than they otherwise would, and toward increasing
liquidity and credit risk. As a consequence, as all banks tend to contract their credit supply, the volume of
bad loans in the banking system increases, causing a deterioration in the quality of overall bank credit
portfolios.
4.4. Crisis
The outbreak of a crisis depends on the occurrence of shocks that the economy cannot absorb.
So one element in a crisis is the magnitude of any shock. A second element is the situation of firms: for
example, how large are firms’ margins of safety relative to the prospective shock; and how many
speculative and Ponzi finance units are there in the economy’s financial structure? As safety margins
decline and more units become Ponzi, the range of interest-rate increases that can trigger crisis rises.
Once the structure of financial payments obligations is punctured, a spiral of decline among investment,
profits and asset prices can readily result.
                                                          
11 Ponzi units can be understood as extreme cases of units with speculative financial postures. Units can be Ponzi due to an
unrelenting (and even irrational) tendency to gamble, or due to the collapse of their ability to generate cash flows (even
without any proclivity toward gambling). In the immediate future, Ponzi  units’ incomes are insufficient to cover their
outstanding interest payments; they must take out additional loans even to meet their financial commitments. Their
indebtedness grows even when interest rates do not rise.18
Whether a fully-fledged financial crisis takes place when a sizeable shock occurs depends upon the
efficacy of central bank lender-of-last-resort behavior, and on whether gross profit flows are sustained by
countercyclical government expenditure.
12 The question of countercyclical policy and its continuing
effectiveness is beyond the scope of this paper. Regarding central-bank intervention, several points can be
made. The central bank can stabilize asset prices (and block the debt deflation spiral) by increasing the
volume and types of eligible assets that it can buy from banks, and also by increasing the volume of
financial assistance to banks. This impedes debt deflation by limiting the liquidity and default risks that
banks face and checking any impulse toward panic.
The disaggregated multiplier model suggests another way to understand how the central bank works: it
maintains macroeconomic conditions that allow banks to make needed adjustments without experiencing
bankruptcies. The central bank can operate like bank k during the  downturn – that is, it can expand loans
even when the bank system  as a whole (bank i) reduces the pace of its loan growth. In effect, the central
bank increases its loan volume (its liquidity assistance), increases its purchase of securities (via open
market and rediscount operations) and inject reserves into the banking system. Thus, expansionary central
bank policy generates more liquid balance sheets for banks, and provides more liquid assets for loans – as
bank i does – without generating a bank crisis.
This central bank action allows banks to make balance-sheet adjustment without more critical
macroeconomic side effects. From the microeconomic point of view, this balance-sheet adjustment results
in low banking profitability, as the relative share of liquid and less profitable assets in total assets reduces.
So a central bank of the type discussed here, when successful, puts the banking system in ‘stand-by’
mode, waiting for signals of better economic prospects before expanding loans again.
5. Conclusion
This paper aimed at clarifying the relationship between individual-bank and banking industry behavior in
credit expansion. We argued that the balance sheet structure of an individual bank is only partially
determined by its management decision, as it is also determined by the balance sheets positions of other
banks. Indeed, according  to our analysis, if banks present different rhythm of loan expansion, ceteris
paribus, the more aggressive banks will lose reserves to the others, and at the same time will present
higher liquidity and insolvency risks.  This relationship was explicitly shown by disaggregating the
variables that enter into the simple money multiplier. This opens at least one way to integrate the micro
and macro levels that comprise Keynesian banking analysis.
The paper also focused on the role of banking in the business cycle. It showed that  banks have an
important and contradictory role in the business cycle: banks’ accommodative behavior can amplify
economic growth during the upturn of a cycle; banks’ contractionary loan-market behavior, due to their
rising liquidity preference, can also amplify the cyclical downturn.
Further research is needed to answer some questions that this paper did not address: in particular, does the
suggested model of banking strategy pertain to an earlier time, when strategic options were more one-
dimensional; does this model remain relevant for the present era, in which banks can pursue diverse
strategies that include not just loan-making but fee-based activities, securitization, and so on? These
important questions can be taken up in future research.
                                                          
12 We might note that the shocks in question can originate with a severe tightening of monetary policy by the central bank (that
is, with ‘shock therapy’) in response to inflationary pressures. In this event, the central bank appears analytically both as the
cause of and the solution to the moment of crisis.19
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on Table 2.
Reserve-to- 
deposit ratios of  
bank k  Bank k  Bank i 
Banking  
sector  Bank k  Bank i Bank k Bank i Bank k Bank i  Bank k  Bank i
0,70  688,24  688,24  1376,47  481,76 344,12 106,47 244,12 1,06 2,44  6,88  6,88
0,65  706,06  706,06  1412,12  458,94 353,03 147,12 253,03 1,47 2,53  7,06  7,06
0,60  725,00  725,00  1450,00  435,00 362,50 190,00 262,50 1,90 2,63  7,25  7,25
0,55  745,16  745,16  1490,32  409,84 372,58 235,32 272,58 2,35 2,73  7,45  7,45
0,50  766,67  766,67  1533,33  383,33 383,33 283,33 283,33 2,83 2,83  7,67  7,67
0,40  814,29  814,29  1628,57  325,71 407,14 388,57 307,14 3,89 3,07  8,14  8,14
0,30  869,23  869,23  1738,46  260,77 434,62 508,46 334,62 5,08 3,35  8,69  8,69
0,20  933,33  933,33  1866,67  186,67 466,67 646,67 366,67 6,47 3,67  9,33  9,33
0,10  1009,09  1009,09  2018,18  100,91 504,55 808,18 404,55 8,08 4,05  10,09  10,09
0,05  1052,38  1052,38  2104,76  52,62 526,19 899,76 426,19 9,00 4,26  10,52  10,52
Assets/Net worth
Annex 1. Changes in some banking variables (bank k and i) for different reserve-to-deposit ratios
Loans Loans/Net worth  Assets  Reserves